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OBERGEFELL’S MISSED OPPORTUNITY  
CATHERINE SMITH* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Obergefell v. Hodges1 will take its rightful place among landmark civil rights 
cases. The blockbuster gay-rights decision, however, also represents the 
Supreme Court’s missed opportunity to balance the scales of justice in favor of 
another group—children. 
 The Obergefell Court was presented with the necessary components—
injury-in-fact and well-established legal precedent—to place the interests of 
children at the center of its analysis, instead of at the margins.2 It was a 
disappointing, albeit expected, omission, because children’s legal interests are 
usually sidelined by an unyielding obsession with the interests of adults in our 
society.3  
 Yet, there is hope for children’s rights advocates. With existing equal 
protection law precedent and Obergefell’s legitimate concern for addressing the 
social, economic, and psychological harm to children, there is a window of 
opportunity to advance children’s equal protection rights in future cases.  
 This article is not advocating only for the interests of children of same-sex 
couples; it is advancing an argument that the legal precedent (the child-centered 
cases) that Obergefell omitted is part of a larger civil rights platform. Often, as 
the cases herein will document, the children of parents who are members of 
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 1.  Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 2.  See generally Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 220, 230 (1982) (finding the denial of education to 
children of undocumented children violated equal protection); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 72 (1968) 
(holding state law that denied wrongful death recovery to children because mother was not married 
violated equal protection). For a list of injuries to children of same-sex parents, see Brief for Scholars of 
the Constitutional Rights of Children as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Obergefell v. Hodges, 
135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (No. 14-556), 2015 WL 1088972. 
 3.  The Supreme Court has recognized children’s constitutional protections in a number of 
contexts, including due process rights in juvenile proceedings, reproductive freedoms, the freedom of 
expression, and equal protection law. See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, The Courage of Innocence: 
Children As Heroes in the Struggle for Justice, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1567, 1577 (2009). Sam Castic, The 
Irrationality of a Rational Basis: Denying Benefits to the Children of Same-Sex Couples, MOD Am., 
Summer–Fall 2007, at 7–8 (“To the extent that the plight of the children of same-sex couples is 
addressed, it is done as a secondary matter.”). 
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marginalized groups—children of color, children of undocumented parents, 
children of gays and lesbians, and children of poor parents—bear the brunt of 
state practices that seek to penalize kids in order to regulate adult behavior.  
 Part I of this article delineates the harms to children from marriage bans, 
harms that the Obergefell Court relied upon to recognize the fundamental right 
to marry for same-sex couples. Part II explains how Obergefell missed an 
opportunity to advance the constitutional rights of children by failing to invoke 
well-established equal protection law.4 This discussion briefly catalogues the 
omitted child-centered cases that warranted a more robust analysis of children’s 
rights. This series of cases begins with the Brown v. Board of Education 
decision, and then turns to a number of post-Brown equal protection cases that 
explicitly prohibited state practices that penalized nonmarital children and 
children of undocumented parents because of the conduct of their parents. With 
this historical backdrop, it is easier to understand that the same-sex marriage 
bans were another iteration of government practices that punish children—this 
time, children of gays and lesbians seeking to marry.5 Part III explains that 
despite the Obergefell Court’s failure to advance the equal protection rights of 
children of same-sex parents, there is reason to be optimistic.6 The opinion, by 
acknowledging the harms to children as relevant to their parents’ constitutional 
claims, indirectly bolsters some of the central themes from these earlier cases. It 
also demonstrates at least some empathy for the plight of kids. To conclude, the 
article briefly offers three central themes from this collection of cases that are 
important to a renewed discussion on the rights of children.  
I 
THE HARMS TO CHILDREN OF GAY AND LESBIAN PARENTS SEEKING TO 
MARRY 
Obergefell v. Hodges made same-sex marriage the law of the land, striking 
down marriage bans and nonrecognition laws as infringements on the 
fundamental right of gays and lesbians under the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.7 The Supreme Court, however, missed a rare 
 
4.    Catherine E. Smith, Equal Protection for Children of Gay and Lesbian Parents: Challenging the 
Three Pillars of Exclusion—Legitimacy, Dual Gender Parenting, and Biology, 28 LAW & INEQ. 307 319 
(2010) (“It is rare for advocates to advance—and for courts to consider—the potential rights and 
remedies of actual children of gay and lesbian couples. . . .”). This was true for same-sex marriage wars 
and it is in fact true across the board when it comes to children. 
 5.  See Catherine Smith, Equal Protection for Children of Same-Sex Parents, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 
1589 (2013). 
 6.  See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (containing no citation to the equal protection children’s rights 
cases). But the majority in Obergefell hinted at the precedent by recognizing that the children’s injuries 
were through “no fault” of their own. Id. at 2600. See generally Catherine E. Smith and Susannah W. 
Pollvogt, Children as Proto-Citizens: Equal Protection, Citizenship, and Lessons From the Child-
Centered Cases, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 655, 659 (2014) (“[W]hile courts have recognized the 
significance of harm to children as a factual matter, they have yet to address its significant as a legal 
matter.”). 
 7.  Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2608–09. 
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opportunity to recognize the equal protection rights of children as a separate 
and distinct constitutional claim based on injury-in fact and legal precedent8 
First, the harms. 
 State marriage bans harmed children of same-sex couples in four ways.9 
First, they foreclosed the main route to family formation for children of same-
sex couples. In most jurisdictions children born into heterosexual marriages are 
presumed to be the child of the marriage and this presumption establishes a 
legal relationship with both parents, even if the child is not biologically related 
to them. For same-sex couples in marriage ban states, biology (or a legal 
adoption) established a legal relationship between the child and one of its same-
sex parents;10 however, the bans precluded the formation of a legal relationship 
between the child and her other, non-biological (or non-adoptive) parent. In 
many marriage ban states, it was impossible for a child of same-sex parents to 
establish a legal relationship with her non-biological (or non-adoptive) parent; 
they were permanent legal strangers.11 As the Obergefell majority recognized in 
describing the legal conundrum of Michigan co-plaintiffs, April DeBoer and 
Jayne Rowse, who were raising three adopted children, “Michigan . . . permits 
only opposite-sex married couples or single individuals to adopt, so each child 
can have only one woman as his or her legal parent.”12  
 Second, marriage bans coupled with nonrecognition laws voided existing 
legal parent-child relationships. Non-recognition laws—state laws that refused 
to recognize married same-sex couples from other states—created uncertainty 
for children of same-sex parents when their families moved from one state to 
another. In a marriage equality state, the child’s relationship to both her parents 
would be legally recognized; in a non-recognition state, like Michigan, the 
child’s relationship with her non-biological (non-adoptive) parent would be 
void.13 
 Third, marriage bans denied children of same-sex couples’ economic rights 
and benefits that would stem from a legal relationship with their non-biological 
parent, including workers’ compensation benefits, social security benefits, and 
wrongful death proceeds.14 They also deprived the child and her parents of 
 
8.   See Smith, supra note 5 (“A child of same-sex parents denied a government benefit has a 
cognizable equal protection challenge – a legal claim that is separate and distinct from that of the 
child’s gay and lesbian parents.”); Brief for Scholars of the Constitutional Rights of Children as Amici 
Curiae Supporting Petitioners, supra note 2 ([A]mici’s analysis, focusing on the equal protection rights 
of children, provides an independent basis for evaluating the constitutionality of the state marriage 
bans.”). 
 9.  Brief for Scholars of the Constitutional Rights of Children as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioners, supra note 2. 
10    The term “parent” is used here in its social and informal connotation, not as a legal term. 
11.   Brief for Scholars of the Constitutional Rights of Children as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioners, supra note 2, at 27. 
 12.  Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2595 (2015). 
13.   Brief for Scholars of the Constitutional Rights of Children as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioners, supra note 2, at 22–27. 
 14. Brief for Scholars of the Constitutional Rights of Children as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioners, supra note 2, at 27. For a more in-depth discussion of the range of economic benefits, see 
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certainty or consistency in treatment when unexpected events or crises 
occurred. The Obergefell majority, once again, explained the conundrum for 
children of same-sex couples seeking to marry: “if an emergency were to arise, 
schools and hospitals may treat the children as if they had only one parent. 
And, were tragedy to befall either DeBoer or Rowse, the other would have no 
legal rights over the child she had not been permitted to adopt.”15 In addition, 
the lack of a legal relationship to the non-biological parent also placed the child 
at risk in the event her parents separated or divorced because of the lack of 
access to child support or a custody arrangement.16 
Fourth, marriage bans inflicted psychological and stigmatic harm to children 
of same-sex parents by “symbolically expressing the inferiority of families 
headed by same-sex couples and the children in those families.”17 
 The Supreme Court recognized these harms for the first time in United 
States v. Windsor. 18 In striking down the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), the 
Court explained that “[t]he differentiation [between same-sex couples and 
opposite-sex couples] brings financial harm to children of same-sex couples” 
and “it humiliates tens of thousands of children now being raised by same-sex 
couples”19 The Court also acknowledged the financial injury that the federal 
marriage ban inflicted on children. 
DOMA . . . brings financial harm to children of same-sex couples. It raises the costs of 
health care to families by taxing health benefits provided by employers to their 
workers’ same-sex spouses. And it denies or reduces benefits allowed to families upon 
the loss of a spouse and parent, benefits that are integral to family security.20 
Consistent with Windsor, the Obergefell majority also recognized the 
psychological and material harms to children of same-sex parents as an 
important consideration in extending the fundamental right to marry to same-
sex couples.21 The Obergefell Court recognized that the right to marry has long 
been considered a fundamental right and that the previous cases establishing 
the right dealt only with opposite-sex couples. In response to the states’ 
arguments that gays and lesbians were claiming a new and nonexistent right to 
“same-sex marriage,” the Court made clear that the relevant inquiry required a 
more comprehensive approach to determine if there is a sufficient reason to 
exclude a class of people from the right to marry. The Court offered four 
principles for why the right to marry has been protected: (1) To allow for 
 
Smith, supra, note 5 at 1603–1606.  
15.   Obergefell, 135 S.Ct. at 2595. 
16.   Brief for Scholars of the Constitutional Rights of Children as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioners, supra note 2, at 27; Smith, supra note 5, at 1604. 
    17.  Id. at 29. 
18.   United States v. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. 2675 (2013). See Brief for the Scholars of the Constitutional 
Rights of Children In Support of Respondent Edith Windsor Addressing The Merits and Supporting 
Affirmance (2013) 
19.   Id. at 2694. 
20.   Id. at 2695 (internal citation omitted) 
21.   The Obergefell dissent made no reference to the injuries or rights of children of same-sex 
couples.  
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individual autonomy in areas of intimate life; (2) to support a unique “two-
person union” through which to find expression, intimacy, and spirituality; (3) 
to offer safeguards for children; and (4) to maintain the country’s democratic 
social order.22 The majority found that same-sex couples and their children were 
no different than opposite-sex couples when it came to these abiding 
principles.23  
The Obergefell Court’s recognition of the harms and interests of children is 
noteworthy; however, it did fall short of a transformative or pivotal paradigm 
shift on behalf of children and their rights to equal protection. The marriage 
bans enacted as part of a state campaign to stem the gay rights movement’s 
push for marriage equality provided an example of state actors penalizing 
children to regulate adult conduct.24 Through these bans, governments treated 
similarly situated children differently because they did not agree with their 
parents’ conduct or status as gays and lesbians. As the next part explains, such 
government conduct defies well-established equal protection precedent; law 
that the Obergefell Court failed to invoke. 
II 
THE LEGAL PRECEDENT OBERGEFELL OMITTED: THE CHILD-CENTERED 
CASES 
 The Obergefell Court recognized the harms to children of same-sex parents 
as a factual matter, yet it ignored precedent. Well-established equal protection 
law establishes that it is impermissible for the government to treat some 
children differently than other children because of the moral disdain of their 
parents’ conduct. This precedent begins with Brown v. Board of Education, a 
case also about children. 
A. Brown v. Board of Education: A Turning Point for Children’s Rights 
As observed by Professor Homer H. Clarke, Jr., “[T]here is nothing in the 
Constitution about children, minors or infants, or parents for that matter.”25 He 
also observed that the interests of children were not present in the Civil War 
Amendments to the Constitution.26 Further, as Professor Barbara Woodhouse 
explains, “Historically, children were objects, and not subjects of the law, 
functioning more in the role of parental property than as persons. They were 
rarely seen as bearers of due process and equal protection rights.”27 After 
Brown v. Board of Education, the view of children as property shifted.28  
 
22.   Id. at 2599–2602.  
23.   Id. 
   24.  See supra Part I.  
 25.  Homer H. Clarke, Jr., Children and the Constitution, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 1 (1992). 
 26.    Id. 
 27.  Woodhouse, supra note 3, at 1577. The Supreme Court has recognized children’s constitutional 
protections in a number of contexts, including due process rights in juvenile proceedings, reproductive 
freedoms, the freedom of expression, and equal protection law.  
 28.  Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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In Brown, the Supreme Court struck down “separate but equal” racially 
segregated schools.29 The Court declared that state-mandated segregation 
denied black children educational opportunities and symbolized their 
inferiority. 
Brown was a turning point for the basic civil rights of African Americans, 
African-American children, and children in general. 30 A few years later, in In re 
Gault,31 the Court recognized that “[n]either the Fourteenth Amendment nor 
the Bill of Rights is for adults alone.”32 And while this “promising bit of dicta 
has never been fully realized,”33 the constitutional foothold for children 
recognized in Brown and Gault has been critical to the minimal constitutional 
rights that children have garnered to date.34 
Brown played a key role in subsequent cases addressing the plight of 
children who faced social, legal and economic exclusion, including the historical 
unequal treatment of nonmarital children. 
B. Levy v. Louisiana and its Progeny—Children and Their Unwed Parents 
Once viewed as filius nullius or the “child of no one,”35 children born to 
unmarried parents were considered “nonpersons” and denied social and legal 
benefits that the federal government offered to marital children as a matter of 
course. For example, in 1944, the Virginia Supreme Court denied Jacqueline 
Brown’s request for child support from her father, because, consistent with 
common law, “a bastard was considered as kin to no one . . . [n]o inheritable 
blood flowed through [her] veins.”36 Nonmarital children were socially 
ostracized, and denied inheritance, parental support, social security, and  other 
benefits simply because the state morally disagreed with their parents’ 
behavior.37 
 The exclusion of nonmarital children fell more harshly on African-
American and poor children, yet attempts to gain traction by incorporating 
 
 29.  Id. at 483 (holding that segregated schools deprived black children of equal educational 
opportunities in violation of the Equal Protection Clause). 
 30.  See Clarke, supra note 25, at 3 (“Another case not generally considered a children’s rights 
case, but one which promised great potential benefits for children, was Brown v. Board of 
Education.”); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse and Sarah Rebecca Katz, Martyrs, the Media and the Web: 
Examining a Grassroots Children’s Rights Movement Through the Lens of Social Movement Theory, 5 
WHITTIER J. OF CHILD AND FAM. ADVOC. 121 (2005). 
 31.  In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 32.  Id. at 13. 
 33.  Woodhouse, supra note 3, at 1578. 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *447 (“[R]ights [of a nonmarital child] are very 
few, being only such as he can acquire; for he can inherit nothing, being looked upon as the son of 
nobody.”); Gareth W. Cook, Bastards, 47 TEX. L. REV. 326, 327 n.11 (1969); Benjamin G. Ledsham, 
Means to Legitimate Ends: Same-Sex Marriage Through the Lens of Illegitimacy-Based 
Discrimination, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2373, 2373 (2007). 
 36.  Brown v. Brown, 32 S.E.2d 79, 80 (1944). 
 37.  See Solangel Maldonado, Illegitimate Harm: Law, Stigma and Discrimination Against 
Nonmarital Children, 63 FLA. L. REV. 345, 346–47 (2011).  
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their disparate treatment into the larger civil rights movement were 
unsuccessful.38 So, advocates chose to try to remedy the disparate impact of 
“illegitimacy” laws by arguing that the exclusion of nonmarital children was an 
equal protection violation itself. 
Decided in 1968, Levy v. Louisiana39 was the first nonmarital status case to 
make its way to the Supreme Court; it changed the social and legal landscape 
for nonmarital children. Louise Levy, an unmarried African-American mother 
died due to medical malpractice.40 Levy’s five children were prohibited from a 
“right to recover” because they were born outside of marriage.41 The Louisiana 
Court of Appeals upheld the dismissal of the children’s claim because “morals 
and general welfare . . . discourage[] bringing children into the world out of 
wedlock.”42  
The Supreme Court struck down the Louisiana law.43 The Court found that 
the children’s “illegitimate” status was unrelated to the mother’s injury.44 Thus, 
Levy found that it was “invidious” discrimination to deny them recovery.45 
Brown was highlighted as an example of the Court being “extremely sensitive 
when it comes to basic civil rights,” and not “hesitat[ing] to strike down [an] 
invidious classification[] even though it had history and tradition on its side.”46 
Levy, in reliance on the tenets of Brown, changed the social and legal landscape 
for nonmarital children.47 
A few years later the Supreme Court again held that a state may not place 
its moral objection of  parental conduct at the feet of the child by withholding 
government benefits. In Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,48 the Court 
overturned another Louisiana law that denied workers’ compensation benefits 
to a deceased worker’s children born outside of the marriage.49 
 
 
38.   See Smith, supra note 5, at 1609; Martha Davis, Male Coverture and the Illegitimate Family, 56 
Rutgers L. Rev. 73, 90 (2003). 
 39.  Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968). 
 40.  Id.  
 41.  John C. Gray & David Rudovsky, The Court Acknowledges the Illegitimate: Levy v. Louisiana 
and Glona v. American Guarantee & Liability Insurance Co., 118 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (1969).  
 42.  Levy, 391 U.S. at 70 (quoting Levy v. State, 192 So. 2d 193, 195 (La. Ct. App. 1967)); Gray & 
Rudovsky, supra note 41, at 3.  
 43.  Levy, 391 U.S. at 72. 
 44.  Id.; see also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982) (finding the denial of education to children 
of undocumented children violated equal protection); Glona v. Am. Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 
73, 76 (1968) (invalidating a Louisiana statute that barred recovery for damages to the mother of an 
illegitimate child, while allowing recovery to the parents of a “legitimate” child under the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause).  
 45.  Levy, 391 U.S. at 72. 
 46.  Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 72 (1968).  
 47.  Brief for Appellee at 15, Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (No. 508), 1968 WL 112826 
(citing Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954)); Martha F. Davis, Male Coverture: Law and the 
Illegitimate Family, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 73, 93–94, 96 (2003).  
 48.  Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972).  
 49.  Id. at 175–76. 
10-SMITH (DO NOT DELETE) 7/8/2016 9:09 AM 
230 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 79:223 
Henry Clyde Stokes died from work-related injuries. Stokes’s marital and 
nonmarital children, all of whom lived in the same household with him, filed 
workers’ compensation claims for their father’s death.50 Under Louisiana 
workers’ compensation law, however, “unacknowledged”51 that nonmarital 
children” were not treated the same as children born to married parents.52 They 
could not recover if the surviving dependents in line before them exhausted the 
maximum benefits.53 As expected, the four marital children were awarded the 
maximum allowable amount, leaving the two nonmarital children with 
nothing.54 The U.S. Supreme Court found the law treated nonmarital children 
differently than marital ones and was “impermissible discrimination.”55 The 
Court reasoned, “An unacknowledged illegitimate child may suffer as much 
from the loss of a parent as a child born within wedlock or an illegitimate later 
acknowledged.”56 To penalize the child would place the child at an economic 
disadvantage for the parents’ acts over which the child has no control. This kind 
of punishment bespeaks an invidious animus not a legitimate governmental 
purpose. 
From 1968 to 1986, the Supreme Court heard more than a dozen cases on 
the rights of nonmarital children, ultimately extending intermediate scrutiny to 
classifications that treated them differently than those born to married 
couples.57 These cases also influenced the equal protection law on the rights of 
children of undocumented persons.58  
C. Plyler v. Doe—Children and Their Undocumented Parents 
In Plyler v. Doe,59 school-aged children of Mexican origin challenged on 
equal protection grounds a Texas statute that withheld state funds from local 
 
 50.  Id. at 165–66. 
 51.  Id. at 167–68. It was not possible for Stokes, the father in Weber, to acknowledge his two 
children because Louisiana law prohibited acknowledgment of children whose parents were incapable 
of marrying at the time of conception. At the time of conception Stokes remained married to Jones, 
thus making it impossible for him to marry Weber. Id. at 171 n.9. 
 52.  Id. at 167–68 (noting that the Louisiana law allowed “legitimate children and acknowledged 
illegitimates” equal recovery, while relegating “unacknowledged illegitimate children” to a lesser 
status). 
 53.  Id. at 168. 
 54.  Id. at 167. 
 55.  Id. at 169. 
 56.  Id. 
 57.  See Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 465 (1988) (holding that Pennsylvania statute was 
unconstitutional under intermediate scrutiny); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 770 (1977); Gomez v. 
Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538 (1973); N.J. Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973) (per curiam). 
For further discussion of the nonmarital status cases, see Smith, supra note 5, at 1608–15. 
58.   I am tracking the court’s language here; however, I believe that there is more to explore in this 
idea that children are targeted because of the moral disdain of their parents’ conduct. After reviewing a 
number of cases, this could also be characterized in different ways. In fact, it could be that children are 
targeted because of the political unpopularity of their parents and that unpopularity could stem from a 
number of things—behavior viewed as immoral, racial or ethnic identity, immigration status, sexual 
orientation, and other reasons. 
 59.  Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
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school districts that chose to enroll and educate children not “legally admitted” 
to the United States.60 The Supreme Court held that excluding children from a 
public education because of their undocumented status was unconstitutional.61 
Relying on the nonmarital status cases, the Court made a distinction 
between adults who were undocumented in the United States as a result of their 
own conduct and their children.62 The Court explained that the children “can 
neither affect their parents’ conduct nor their own status,”63 and to legislate 
against them would not be consistent with basic notions of justice.64 
The Court went on to say, 
[M]ore is involved in these cases than the abstract question whether [the statute] 
discriminates against a suspect class, or whether education is a fundamental right. [The 
statute] imposes a lifetime of hardship on a discrete class of children not accountable 
for their disabling status. The stigma of illiteracy will mark them for the rest of their 
lives. By denying these children a basic education, we deny them the ability to live 
within the structure of our civic institutions, and foreclose any realistic possibility that 
they will contribute in even the smallest way to the progress of our Nation.
65
 
The Plyler Court was intensely aware of the ills of imposing a discriminating 
burden on a child who has no control over his or her undocumented status.66 
Brown, Levy, Weber, and Plyler offer significant insights into the rights of 
children. Further, despite omitting this legal precedent, Obergefell does express 
concern for the social, psychological, and economic harms to the children of 
same-sex couples in its decision to extend constitutional protections to same-sex 
couples seeking to marry. In fact, Obergefell itself hinted at this line of 
precedent, without citation, by recognizing that children of same-sex parents 
were denied the benefits of marriage “through no fault of their own.” 
 
III 
IMPORTANT EQUAL PROTECTION VALUES DERIVED FROM THE CHILD-
CENTERED CASES  
The child-centered cases challenge the notion that some children are worthy 
of economic, and social safeguards, while others are not because of what boils 
down to their status as children of adults who are characterized by government 
actors as “immoral.”   
These cases have been viewed as “unique,” limited to their factual 
circumstances, or unrelated to each other in equal protection lore, but they 
need not be. When viewed collectively, they offer important themes or guiding 
principles about on the rights of children and equal protection law in general. 
 
 60.  Id. at 205–06, 209. 
 61.  Id. at 230. Of note, the Court first found that undocumented children are “persons” within the 
meaning of Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 210.  
 62.  Id. at 220. 
 63.  Id. (quoting Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 770 (1977)).  
 64.  Id.  
 65.  Id. at 223. 
 66.  Id. at 219–220. 
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Obergefell (and Windsor) also indirectly bolsters a number of the themes. The 
last part briefly explores some of the themes that can be drawn from this 
collection of cases.67 
A. Protecting Children from Economic Harm  
A key theme in the child-centered cases (and indirectly in Windsor and 
Obergefell) is that government actors may not impede economic support to 
children simply because of their status at birth.68 They reiterate that the 
government cannot deny children access to basic economic building blocks—
access to benefits, access to routes to a legal parent–child relationship or access 
to an education. These cases challenged the idea that some children are worthy 
of economic safety nets and others are not simply because of they are the 
children of adults who are characterized by government actors as “immoral.”69 
In fact, the Levy Court acknowledged that when dealing with social and 
economic legislation, latitude was necessary. The Court then exercised its 
latitude and struck the law withholding financial resources down because the 
children “though illegitimate, were dependent on [the mother] . . . in her death 
they suffered wrong in the sense that any dependent would.”70  
Similarly, in a later nonmarital child case, New Jersey Welfare Rights 
Organization v. Cahill,71 the Supreme Court again demonstrated a concern for 
economic injury to children and found New Jersey’s Assistance to Families and 
Working Poor program to be unconstitutional because it limited benefits only 
to households comprised of opposite-sex married couples with “legitimate” 
children.72 The Court found that the benefits under the welfare program were as 
“indispensable to the health and well-being of illegitimate children as to the 
health and well-being of those who are legitimate.”73 As explained in another 
nonmarital status case, even when it comes to economic legislation, “[O]nce a 
 
67.  There are certainly other themes that are present as well. For example, Susannah Pollvogt and I 
argued that this line of cases offers greater meaning to the equal protection guarantee of citizenship. 
See Smith & Pollvogt, supra note 6, at 659. 
 68.  As Professor Laurence Nolan stated in explaining the nonmarital status cases, “[E]qual 
opportunity of economic support was impeded because of discrimination based on birth status.” 
Laurence C. Nolan, “Unwed Children” and Their Parents Before the United States Supreme Court from 
Levy to Michael H.: Unlikely Participants in Constitutional Jurisprudence, 28 CAP. U.L. REV. 1, 66 
(1999). 
 69.  See Nolan, supra note 68, at  25 (“Clearly, the result of these cases on behalf of children born 
to unwed parents has been the transformation of law and policy regarding legitimacy and illegitimacy as 
to economic rights, nationally. That is, the cases set a floor, which all states are constitutionally bound 
to follow in regard to these children.”); see also Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1983) (quoting 
Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538 (1973)) (“[A] state may not invidiously discriminate against 
illegitimate children by denying them substantial benefits accorded children generally.”). 
 70.  Id. at 72. 
 71.  N.J. Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973) (per curiam). 
 72.  Id. at 619 (quoting N.J. STAT. § 44:13-3(a) (West 1971)) (noting that New Jersey’s program 
limited benefits to households “composed of two adults of the opposite sex ceremonially married to 
each other who have at least one minor child . . . of both, the natural child of one and adopted by the 
other, or a child adopted by both . . .”). 
 73.  Cahill, 411 U.S. at 621. 
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state posits a judicially enforceable right on behalf of children to needed 
support from their natural fathers there is no constitutional justification for 
denying such an essential right to a child simply because is natural father had 
not married its mother.”74  
 Professor Laurence Nolan accurately explains that “the result of these cases 
on behalf of children born to unwed parents has been the transformation of law 
and policy regarding legitimacy and illegitimacy as to economic rights, 
nationally. That is, the cases set a floor, which all states are constitutionally 
bound to follow in regard to these children.”75 Importantly, the nonmarital cases 
were not alone in raising the concern for unequal treatment for access to 
economic resources. 
While Levy and Weber focused on children denied access to economic 
benefits, Plyler highlighted education’s link to economic sufficiency as a 
concern on behalf of children of undocumented parents denied access to public 
schools. Plyler explained that education is important for a number of reasons, 
including that it provides the “basic tools by which individuals might lead 
economically productive lives to benefit us all.”76 
Finally, in both Windsor and Obergefell, although failing to cite any legal 
precedent on the treatment of children, the Supreme Court was especially 
concerned with the economic impact that marriage bans had on children of 
same-sex parents. In Windsor, the Court explained the financial injury the 
federal marriage ban inflicted on children: 
DOMA . . . brings financial harm to children of same-sex couples. It raises the cost of 
health care for families by taxing health benefits provided by employers to their 
workers’ same sex spouses. And it denies or reduces benefits allowed to families upon 
the loss of a spouse or parent, benefits that are an integral part of family security.
77
 
Obergefell did the same, noting that children experience “material” and 
psychological harm from marriage bans and nonrecognition laws.78 
The children’s rights cases offer much to explore for scholars and activists 
seeking to understand the role of economic injury in the equal protection 
guarantee. 
B. Protecting Children from Stigmatic or Psychological Harms 
In addition to an important consideration of economic harm, the child-
centered cases have another persistent theme: seeking to guard against 
 
 74.  Gomez, 409 U.S. at 538. 
 75.  See Nolan, supra note 68, at 25 (“Clearly, the result of these cases on behalf of children born to 
unwed parents has been the transformation of law and policy regarding legitimacy and illegitimacy as to 
economic rights, nationally. That is, the cases set a floor, which all states are constitutionally bound to 
follow in regard to these children.”); see also Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1983) (quoting Gomez 
v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538 (1973) (“[A] state may not invidiously discriminate against illegitimate 
children by denying them substantial benefits accorded children generally.”)). 
 76.  Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982). 
 77.  United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695 (2013). 
 78.  Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2600 (2015). 
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psychological harm to children. This theme is influenced heavily by Brown, 
which highlighted the adverse psychological effects of de jure segregation on 
black children. 
To separate them from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their 
race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may 
affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone . . . Segregation of 
white and colored children in public schools has a detrimental effect upon the colored 
children. The impact is greater when it has the sanction of the law, for the policy of 
separating the races is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the negro 
group.79 
Similarly, in Plyler, the Court described the effect of the law denying 
children of undocumented parents access to an education as having an 
“inestimable toll . . . on the social[,] economic, intellectual, and psychological 
well-being of the individual.”80 Further, Windsor recognized DOMA’s psychic 
and stigmatic harm to children of same-sex couples and the Court there 
explained, 
[I]t humiliates tens of thousands of children now being raised by same-sex couples. 
The law in question makes it even more difficult for the children to understand the 
integrity and closeness of their own family and its concord with other families in their 
community and in their daily lives . . . DOMA instructs all federal officials, and indeed 
all persons with whom same-sex couples interact, including their own children, that 
their marriage is less worthy than the marriages of others.
81
 
Obergefell reinforced this notion by viewing the psychological benefits of 
marriage as even more profound than its material ones.82 These cases 
demonstrate that both economic and psychological harms to children raise 
equal protection concerns. 
C. Protecting Children from Punishment for Matters beyond Their Control 
A central tenet of equal protection law is that it is unfair to discriminate 
against an individual because of a trait or characteristic derived at birth that 
cannot be changed.83 Most lawyers think of the concept of immutability as 
relevant to race-based equal protection cases; however, a persistent strand of 
immutability stems from the child-centered cases. The Weber Court, citing a 
number of cases including Brown, explained that “imposing disabilities on the 
illegitimate child is contrary to the basic concept of our system that legal 
burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility or 
 
 79.  Id. at 494 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 80.  Plyler, 457 U.S. at 222. 
 81.  Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2694–96.  
 82.  Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2600. 
 83.  See, e.g., Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 176 (1972) (citing a number of cases 
including Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505 (1976) (“the legal status of illegitimacy, however defined, 
is, like race or national origin, a characteristic determined by causes not within the control of the 
illegitimate individual, and it bears no relation to the individual’s ability to participate in and contribute 
to society”); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973); Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 
483 (1954)). 
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wrongdoing.”84 The Court was clear that it could not prevent the social 
disapproval of children born outside of marriage; it could, however, “strike 
down discriminatory laws relating to the status of birth.”85 
The early immutability concepts in the nonmarital status cases played an 
important role in subsequent equal protection law. The Supreme Court 
eventually relied on Weber’s immutability rationales to extend heightened 
scrutiny for gender classifications.86 
Furthermore, the core principle against discrimination based on birth 
characteristics was also prevalent in Plyler. These important themes from the 
child-centered cases and Obergefell are worthy of further attention from 
lawyers, jurists and legal scholars. 
IV 
CONCLUSION 
 
Obergefell missed an opportunity to place children’s’ legal interests at the 
center of an equal protection law claim. The government exclusion of children 
of same-sex parents from the social, legal and economic benefits of marriage 
because of the moral disdain of their parents’ relationships (and to incentivize 
adult behavior) violated well-established equal protection law. Yet, there is 
reason for optimism. Obergefell, when read in tandem with the omitted legal 
precedent or the child-centered cases, could serve as an additional legal 
building block to erect a more comprehensive children’s rights agenda. 
Children’s interests should not be the collateral damage of their parents’ legal 
and political losses, nor should children simply be the fortunate beneficiaries of 
their parents’ wins.87 Rather, they should be able to vindicate their injuries 
within the ambit of the Equal Protection Clause in their own right. 
 
 84.  See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 441 (1985) (“Because illegitimacy is 
beyond the individual's control and bears ‘no relationship to the individual's ability to participate in 
and contribute to society,’ . . . official discriminations resting on that characteristic are also subject to 
somewhat heightened review. Those restrictions ‘will survive equal protection scrutiny to the extent 
they are substantially related to a legitimate state interest.’”); Mathews, 427 U.S. at 505 (stating that 
status of illegitimacy “is like race or national origin, a characteristic determined by causes not within 
the control of the illegitimate individual”); Weber, 406 U.S. at 175–76.  
 85.  Weber, 406 U.S. at 176 n. 14 (citing Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); Hunter v. 
Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969); Brown, 347 U.S. 483; Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943)). 
 86.  Frontiero, 411 U.S. 677 (quoting Weber,  for the proposition that “since sex, like race and 
national origin, is an immutable characteristic determined solely by the accident of birth, the imposition 
of special disabilities upon the members of a particular sex would seem to violate the basic concept of 
our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility”). (internal 
quotations omitted).  
 87.  See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2600–01 (2015). 
